

CASE NUMBER 84-231

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 1984

ALVIN D. HOOPER AND MARY N. HOOPER, APPELLANTS

VS.

BERNALILLO COUNTY ASSESSOR,
APPELLEE

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Alvin Dillard Hooper Counsel of Record 1712 Pedregoso Pl., SE Albuquerque, NM 87123 (505) 844-8900

Harold L. Folley 1743 Soplo, SE Albuquerque, NM 87123

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
TABLE	OF AUTHORITIES	ii
ARGUM	ENT	1
Ι.	THE MAY 8, 1976 DATE IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIETNAM OR ANY OTHER EVENT AND RESIDENCY ON THAT	
	DATE, OR IMMEDIATELY PRIOR THERETO, IS NOT REQUIRED	1
II.	THE CHALLENGED STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE A SPECIAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE VETERAN AND NEW MEXICO BASED ON RESIDENCY DURING MILITARY SERVICE	6
III.	THE CHALLENGED RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT BURDENS APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO STRICT SCRUTINY	12
IV.	THE REQUIREMENT OF RESIDENCY PRIOR TO MAY 8, 1976 CAN BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE STATUTE BY THIS COURT	16
CONCL	USION	18
APPEN	DIX A	Al

### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:	Page
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)	13
<pre>Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973)</pre>	18
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) 1	1,13,14
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)	11,13 14,15
State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 503 P.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1972)	16,17
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)	11,12 14,15
Constitutional Provisions:	
U.S. Constitution amend. 14, \$1	11
Treaties:	
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1, §5 at 6;	
T.I.A.S. No. 7542, \$5 at 6	2

	Page
Statutes:	
38 U.S.C. §101(8)(9) (1982)	5
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-37-5 (1978) (as amended)	3,5,6
1933 N.M. Laws, ch. 44, §1	5
1947 N.M. Laws, ch. 79, §1	5
Other:	
N.Y. Times: Jan. 24, 1973 at 1; Jan. 28, 1973 at 1; and Mar. 30, 1973 at 1,	2.Ann. A

This brief replies to the briefs of appellee Bernalillo County Assessor (hereinafter "Assessor"), amicus curiae State of New Mexico (hereinafter "State"), and amicus curiae American Legion, et al. (hereinafter "Legion"). Those three briefs are based on the erroneous premises and incorrect facts set forth below and consequently are of little value in clarifying the issues in this case.

I. THE MAY 8, 1976 DATE IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIETNAM OR ANY OTHER EVENT AND RESIDENCY ON THAT DATE, OR IMMEDIATELY PRIOR THERETO, IS NOT REQUIRED.

Appellee Assessor erroneously states
that the challenged May 8, 1976 date
"...is one year from the date on which
American troops in Vietnam were
withdrawn..." and thus is directly and
rationally related to that event.
Appellee's Br. 2, 22.

A cursory review of public records indicates that the Vietnam cease-fire agreement was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, and the last American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam on March 29, 1973. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-nam, Jan. 27, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1, §5 at 6; T.I.A.S. No. 7542, §5 at 6. See also, N.Y. Times: Jan. 24, 1973 at 1; Jan. 28, 1973 at 1; and Mar. 30, 1973 at 1, col. 1-3 (copies attached as Appendix A).

In light of the correct facts, the connection of the May 8, 1976 date to the withdrawal of troops becomes much more tenuous than appellee asserts. In short, the May 8, 1976 date is arbitrary and has no direct or rational connection to troop withdrawal or anything else which can be a legitimate basis for discriminating among resident-veterans. In its decision below,

the Court of Appeals of New Mexico relied, at least in part, on this same incorrect fact now being asserted anew by appellee.

J.S. App. B 15-16.

Appellee Assessor also asserts that this statute in essence simply provides an exemption to Vietnam-era veterans who were residents of New Mexico on May 7, 1976, and the retroactive declaration of this benefit in 1983 does not make it any less valid. Appellee's Br. 20-21. This assertion and accompanying reasoning is fallacious. Section C(3)(d) of N.M. Stat. Ann. 7-37-5 requires residency at any time "...prior to...May 8, 1976...", not on May 7, 1976. Further, the declaration in 1983 of a tax exemption for those veterans who had been residents on May 7, 1976 is clearly not the same as making that same declaration on May 7, 1976. In the latter case, the State would have been making no

veterans, i.e., if the declaration had been made on May 7, 1976, all resident-veterans at that time would have received the benefit. However, in the actual case herein of the declaration in 1983, the State was clearly discriminating among its then bona fide resident-veterans.

Appellee Assessor next argues that the May 8, 1976 date is valid because it corresponds with similar conditions imposed on veterans of other conflicts in order to receive the tax exemption.

Appellee's Br. 2, 15, 20 n. 11. See also, Amicus State's Br. 9 and Amicus Legion's Br. 3. That argument of course assumes the validity of the residency requirements for other conflicts, a matter not free from doubt. Further, the argument is not factually correct. The residency requirement set forth in N.M. Stat. Ann.

7-37-5C(3) for each other conflict was added prior to or about the time of the designated date itself and/or the designated date corresponds with the date established by Congress for determination of eligibility for certain veterans' benefits. The May 8, 1976 date challenged herein has neither of these features.

The January 1, 1934 residency requirement for World War I veterans was enacted in 1933. 1933 N.M. Laws, ch. 44, §1. The January 1, 1947 date for World War II veterans was added in March 1947. 1947 N.M. Laws, ch. 79, §1. The January 1, 1947 date for World War II and the February 1, 1955 date for the Korean War both correspond with the dates established by Congress for determination of eligibility for certain veterans' benefits. 38 U.S.C. §101(8), (9) (1982).

II. THE CHALLENGED STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE A SPECIAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE VETERAN AND NEW MEXICO BASED ON RESIDENCY DURING MILITARY SERVICE.

Beginning on the very first page with appellee's Question Presented and continuing throughout the brief, appellee repeatedly asserts and relies upon the erroneous premise that this challenged statute provides a tax exemption for "...veterans who resided in the State at the time of entering or leaving wartime service..." and validly denies that benefit to other veterans such as appellant. Appellee's Br. at (i), passim. Amicus curiae State and amicus curiae Legion rely on this same erroneous premise but neither appellee nor amici point to any statutory language or other support for this premise.

Even a cursory reading of N.M. Stat.

Ann. § 7-37-5 (1978) shows that it
requires no special nexus or relationship

between the veteran and New Mexico based on residency during military service. Rather, that statute requires that the veteran must have served "...on active duty continuously for ninety days... during a period in which the armed forces were engaged in armed conflict..." and that the veteran must have been a "...New Mexico resident prior to... May 8, 1976.... Whether that period of prior residency overlaps with, is in close proximity to, or is remote from the period of military service is immaterial. Having once established residency at any age and at any time prior to May 8, 1976, a person could have left New Mexico and resided in another state for an extended period, entered service from that other state, returned to that other state after completing service and remained there indefinitely without being denied the tax

exemption once he or she finally returned to New Mexico. Appellants' Br. 29-30, 39-40. Regardless of what the statute previously provided, or even what the legislature intended for it to provide after its amendments in 1981 and 1983, the plain language of the statute in its present form does not require a special nexus based on a coincidence of military service and residency in New Mexico. See Appellants' Br. App. A. Accordingly, appellee's and amici's complete reliance on this erroneous special-nexus premise nullifies their arguments.

Whether a special nexus based on a coincidence of military service and residency is a valid basis by itself for discriminating between bona fide resident-veterans has apparently never been addressed in an opinion by this Court and need not be addressed in this case. In

any event, that special nexus is a substantial factor not present in this challenged New Mexico statute. Thus this Court need not address appellee's Question Presented.

In reliance on the erroneous specialnexus premise, appellee argues that the statute is designed to benefit "...veterans leaving or returning to the State at times of conflict..." and to address "...the particular strains felt by servicemen as they leave, or just after they return to, civilian life." Appellee's Br. 6, 17. Appellee continues that immediately after returning, veterans "...faced problems while in New Mexico that later arrivals simply did not. By the time this latter class of veterans had migrated to New Mexico, they had already had the opportunity to readjust to civilian life.... " Appellee's Br. at 18.

See also, Amicus State's Br. at 5 and Amicus Legion's Br. at 2, 3. The history of this statute clearly refutes those arguments. The previous May 8, 1975 date was not added to the statute until 1981 and the present May 8, 1976 date was not added until 1983. Appellants' Br. App. A. Thus the tax exemption was not given to the veterans who migrated to New Mexico during the May 7, 1975-May 7, 1976 period until approximately eight years after their return to civilian life. It is ludicrous to suggest that this alleged interest in helping veterans readjust to civilian life supports the retroactive selection in 1983 of the May 8, 1976 cutoff date for residency. It also is pure speculation to assume in 1983 that the veterans who arrived after May 7, 1976 would have less need for, or be less deserving of, the tax exemption than the

veterans who arrived during the May 7, 1975-May 7, 1976 period.

Appellee Assessor and amicus State assert that so long as the statute "generally" or "for the most part" serves an intended purpose, it is valid. Appellee's Br. at 18, 23 n. 15; Amicus State's Br. at 6. Such reasoning discards any concept of individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and would virtually immunize all legislation from any challenge that it violates equal protection or due process rights of a state citizen. A statute must be tailored for its intended purpose. There is little doubt that the statutes invalidated in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and numerous other cases "generally" served the purpose of

providing welfare benefits, etc., to those who needed them. Nevertheless, those statutes were invalidated because they violated constitutional rights guaranteed to any person within the jurisdiction of the state.

III. THE CHALLENGED RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT BURDENS APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO STRICT SCRUTINY.

For the reasons set forth above and in their brief, pages 25-53, appellants believe the challenged residency requirement is analogous to that addressed in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), and like that requirement, it cannot pass even the minimum rational purpose test. However, if this Court does decide that this minimum test is passed, it should go further and subject this challenged residency requirement to strict scrutiny because of its burden on appellants' right

to travel as set forth in appellants' brief, pages 54-73.

Appellee and amici predictably argue that appellants' right to travel has not been burdened because they have not been denied a fundamental right or benefit. They read this Court's decisions as establishing an exclusive list of rights and benefits which must be denied before infringement of the right to travel can be invoked. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (nonemergency medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits). Such rationale is nothing more than an attempt to water down the fundamental right to travel and make it synonymous with some denied benefit.

Appellee and amici also argue that a

benefit must be a substantial factor in deciding whether or not to migrate to a state before its denial would unconstitutionally burden the right to travel. Appellee's Br. 10-11, 13; Amicus State's Br. 3, 5; Amicus Legion's Br. 4. That is nothing more than another face of the contention that deterrence is required. That contention is not supportable. See Appellants' Br. 61-62.

The argument that the tax exemption could be withdrawn at any time and thus its denial does not impose a penalty is not worthy of consideration. Amicus State's Br. 5. The same argument appears equally applicable, and equally nonpersuasive, with respect to the welfare benefits in Shapiro, the medical care in Memorial Hospital, and the dividend in Zobel. The penalty on the right to travel arises from discriminatory distribution of

a benefit based solely upon the time of exercising that fundamental right, not on whether the benefit is provided at all.

See Appellants' Br. 60-61.

The challenged residency requirement divides New Mexico's resident Vietnam-era veterans into two classes, indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of veterans who resided in the State at some time before May 8, 1976, and the other is composed of veterans such as Hooper who did not have such prior residence. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 627. It is clear that the right to travel of the latter class has been burdened because they have been disadvantaged and relegated to secondclass citizenship status as compared with the former class solely because of the date of exercise of that right. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 60 n. 6. This

burden calls for strict scrutiny by this

Court of the residency requirement

creating the disadvantage. See

Appellants' Br. 59-68. This residency

requirement cannot withstand even minimal

scrutiny. A fortiori, it cannot withstand

strict scrutiny.

IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF RESIDENCY PRIOR TO MAY 8, 1976 CAN BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE STATUTE BY THIS COURT.

Appellee Assessor incorrectly states the New Mexico law regarding severability.

Compare appellee's brief, page 25, note 18, subparagraph (3) with the third test set forth in State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 368, 503 P.2d 649, 651 (Ct. App. 1972). Appellants' Br. 86-87. Appellee's incorrect statement of the law would in essence place the burden on appellants herein to show that the New Mexico legislature would have passed the statute

had it known of the invalidity of the objectionable part. Amici echo this incorrect statement. Amicus State's Br.

9; Amicus Legion's Br. 6. The New Mexico rule for severability as set forth in Spearman clearly places the burden on appellee herein to refute severability by showing that the legislature would not have passed the statute had it known of the invalidity of the May 8, 1976 date.

Appellee has not, and cannot, meet that burden.

The fact that New Mexico law may govern the issue of severability of the invalid residency requirement does not mean that this Court should abstain from making that decision. The New Mexico law on severability is clear and needs no further interpretation by the New Mexico courts. Appellants' Br. 84-88. The New Mexico law remains only to be applied, not

interpreted. Thus there are no special circumstances which would justify the delay and expense to the Hoopers which would result from this Court declining to decide the severability of the residency requirement if it is found invalid.

Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973).

### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in appellants' brief,, the relief previously requested by appellants on pages 89-90 of that brief should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Alvin Dillard Hooper Counsel of Record 1712 Pedregoso Pl., SE Albuquerque, NM 87123 (505) 844-8900

Harold L. Folley 1743 Soplo, SE Albuquerque, NM 87123

### The New York Times

# VIETNAM ACCORD IS REACHED; CEASE-FIRE BEGINS SATURDAY; P.O.W.'S TO BE FREE IN 60 DAYS



Transcript of the Speech by President on Vietnam



A1


## The New York Times

# VIETNAM PEACE PACTS SIGNED; AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR HALTS

### Nation Ends Draft, Turns to Volunteers









A2

"All the News That's Pit to Print"

# The New York Times

LATE CITY EDITION

U.S. Forces Out of Vietnam; PRESIDENT WARRS NIXON SETS MEAT PRICE CEILINGS AT BOTH WHOLESALE AND RETAIL; ASSERTS COSTS 'SHOULD GO DOWN' WITH TRUCE PACT Linked High Nixon Aides to Watergate, in the Ast Authority Linked High Nixon Aides to Watergate, in the Oat of Section of Comments of Comments

A3